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The Effectiveness of Regional Active Labour Market Policies 
to Fight against Unemployment: An Analysis for Catalonia 
 
The aim of this work is to assess the effectiveness of active labour market policies carried out 
by the Catalan Public Employment Services (SOC) during the year 2005. The results 
obtained from the application of matching techniques show that the probability of finding a job 
for an individual who participated in any of the analyzed SOC’s actions is 5 percentage points 
higher in relation to those who did not participate. The individual analysis of the different 
programs has shown the effectiveness of the greater part of the actions carried out. Last, the 
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1. Background and aims
1 
 
Data from EUROSTAT for 2005 show that the member states of the European Union 
(EU-15) spent 2.2% of their GDP on implementing labour market policies. This figure 
ranged from 0.2% in Estonia to 4.1% in Denmark. In Spain, the amount spent on labour 
policies represented 2.1% of its GDP, just slightly below the European mean. 
 
Labour market policies include a set of relatively heterogeneous public actions and 
measures. Indeed, there would seem to be no generally accepted definition as to what 
should or should not be included within this package of policies. However, they 
typically include all those measures directed at the unemployed and the improvement of 
the job market, as well as measures that involve no public expenditure but which have a 
wide impact on the job market (including legislative changes that affect wage-setting 
mechanisms, the flexibility to hire and fire workers and the organisation of working 
hours). 
 
Arguably the most widely accepted classification of labour market policies is that 
proposed by the OECD, which distinguishes between passive and active policies. The 
former are understood to be all those measures that seek to improve the situation of the 
unemployed and which try to guarantee them certain levels of income. By contrast, 
active policies are understood to be all those measures that seek to have a direct impact 
on the operation of the job market in terms of increasing labour demand (be it across the 
board or for just one specific group of workers that faces particular difficulties in 
finding work), but also those measures that seek to improve the adjustment processes 
between supply and demand in the labour market (for example, the organization of 
worker training programs, giving incentives to promote geographical mobility and 
improving channels of information between firms and workers). 
 
As Fina and Toharia (2001) point out, the relative importance of these two types of 
policy has fluctuated over time depending on a range of factors, but primarily, on the 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank the Catalan Employment Office (Servei d’Ocupació de Catalunya) for 
its help in constructing the database used here, and for its suggestions and comments regarding our work. 
Jordi Suriñach and Manuel Artís were supported by a grant received from the Ministry of Education via 
project ECO2009-12678. Any errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.   
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phase of the business cycle reached by the economy being analysed, the health of its 
public finances and, above all, on the rate of unemployment at any particular time. In 
recent decades, active policies have acquired greater weight as passive policies do not 
seem to contribute to a reduction in unemployment but rather only help improve the 
situation of the unemployed until they find work. Indeed, the latter were designed to 
minimize the problems of unemployment when there were no great problems for 
finding work relatively quickly (frictional unemployment) and in a context when the 
public sector resources dedicated to these policies in times of recession are expected to 
be recovered in times of growth thanks to automatic stabilizers. In fact, today, in the 
EU-15 approximately 40% of the budget linked to labour market policies is spent on 
active policies, with the remaining 60% being dedicated to passive policies. 
Specifically, 0.8% of GDP in the EU-15 is spent on active policies. In Spain this figure 
stands at 0.7%, while the country that dedicates the highest percentage of it resources to 
active policies is Holland with 1.6% of its GDP while the lowest percentage is recorded 
by Greece and Estonia at just 0.1%.  
 
Thus, active policies are born from the realization that at given moments the 
characteristics of the unemployed (their skills and geographical location) do not match 
those of the job vacancies, resulting in long-term or structural unemployment. Active 
labour market policies, therefore, seek to, improve training or to promote worker 
mobility to enhance their capacity to fill job vacancies. However, other types of active 
policy do aim to create new jobs, either through the direct creation of work in the public 
sector or the awarding of financial incentives (normally in the form of subsidies) linked 
to the creation of jobs which, at times, might be aimed at developing new production 
practices. Often this latter type of policy seeks to find work for specific groups of 
workers with particular problems. However, active policies of this kind have come in 
for considerable criticism as they are high cost and tend to be affected by opportunistic 
behaviour (deadweight effect), i.e., the subsidy is paid to create jobs that would have 
been created anyway. These policies can have other undesirable effects including those 
of substitution between different types of worker (subsidized vs. non-subsidized); those 
of expulsion, whereby subsidized firms obtain a competitive advantage with the result 
that non-subsidized firms lose their market share and have to shed labour; and those of 
wage pressure, since by reducing the costs of dismissal (to the extent that workers who 
lose their jobs will be sent on retraining programs), wage pressure increases and,  
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therefore, employment can be negatively affected. Thus, depending on the relative 
importance of these effects, the impact on employment tends to be uncertain. 
 
As Card et al. (2009) point out, the effectiveness of policies of this type has been the 
subject of intense debate in many countries. And, furthermore, the rigorous evaluation 
of data relating to participants and non-participants in active labour programs so as to 
quantify the effects of such policies is a procedure that should be carried out 
periodically by both the public administration and independent experts. In a recent 
study, for example, Kluve (2007) analyses more than a hundred different studies 
examining the impact of active labour policies by applying meta-analysis techniques.  
 
By contrast, there have been very few microeconometric studies conducted in Spain, 
with the notable exceptions of Mato and Cueto (2009) and Arellano (2009) in the case 
of job training programs and Cansino and Sánchez (2009) in the case of vocational 
training programs (casas-taller and casas de oficio). These three studies report a 
positive effect on the unemployed that have participated on these programs: the first 
study shows that the job training program increases the probability of being in work by 
roughly 8 to 9%, the second confirms the finding that training reduces the time spent 
out of work and the third shows the effectiveness of the program for the group for 
which it is designed, namely young people seeking their first job. 
 
An important factor to bear in mind, when evaluating active labour market policies in 
Spain, is the process of decentralization that has occurred in this policy area in recent 
years. Thus, today each region or Autonomous Community has the power to determine 
the most suitable policies to adopt and the best way to implement them. Thus, the most 
suitable spatial level at which to analyse the impact of active policies is that associated 
with the normative power concerning these policies: namely, the Autonomous 
Community. Furthermore, even during the latest phase of expansion, the Spanish labour 
market has been characterized by a high degree of variation in its regional 
unemployment levels, a fact that might lead to even greater differences in the 
application of active labour market policies. 
 
Against this background, the case of Catalonia is especially interesting since within this 
process of decentralization, it was the first to take charge of occupational training. This  
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occurred in 1992 and it was, moreover, together with Galicia, one of the two 
communities where the transfer of the management of the state employment office - 
INEM - became effective as early as January 1998, while the transfer to the other 
communities did not occur until later. Thus, the experience acquired by the Catalan 
autonomous authorities in this field has been greater than that of the other Autonomous 
Communities. Moreover, it has had the opportunity to introduce a greater number of 
programs and more varied instruments so that an evaluation of its policies should offer 
conclusions of interest for the design of active labour market policies in other 
Autonomous Communities.  
 
Thus, the aim of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the active labour market 
policies promoted by the Catalan Labour Office (Servei d’Ocupació de Catalunya, 
henceforth SOC) during the year 2005 by applying microeconometric techniques. 
 
The contribution of this study to the literature on this subject is two-fold: on the one 
hand, this is the first rigorous evaluation of several active labour market policies in 
Spain (and not just of one specific program) and, on the other, it analyses the ways in 
which some of these programs might complement each other. The results obtained from 
the application of matching techniques show that the probability of finding work for an 
individual who, in 2005, participated on one of the actions organized by SOC was 5 
percentage points higher than those that did not participate. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured in three parts: first, we present the database employed 
in conducting the study; second, we describe the methodology adopted and the results it 
provided; and, third, we summarize the main conclusions drawn from our analysis. 
 
2. Description of the database used  
 
The evaluation undertaken here has been facilitated by the availability of a broad 
database of individuals, which was previously made anonymous, and provided by SOC 
under the usual conditions of statistical secrecy. The SOC is responsible for virtually all 
active labour policies in Catalonia. Specifically, it undertakes three main lines of action 
- training, providing incentives and job advice, and it is organized in five main areas - 
equal opportunities, job information and guidance, professional qualifications, work and  
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training and job creation schemes. It is engaged in nine separate programs, which are 
described in greater detail below. 
 
The database contains information regarding the socio-demographic characteristics of 
participants as well as non-participants in SOC actions during 2005. It also contains 
details regarding their work situation in December 2007 and January 2008, that is, 
between one and two years after participating on the programs. This is the reference 
variable for undertaking our evaluation. Specifically, we have access to data regarding 
the individuals’ gender, age, schooling level, their municipality of residence, the type of 
action in which they participated and their current work status
2.  
 
According to this information, in 2005, there were 158,415 participants involved in 
SOC actions. As can be seen in Table 1, the programs with the greatest number of 
participants during that year were the regional employment pacts (48.7%), the job 
training programs for the unemployed (27.0%) and the personalized employment 
support programs (13.0%). The regional pacts are innovative and experimental actions 
that complement active labour policies albeit without any specific normative 
regulations, and which seek to promote local development, serving as a means of 
coordinating active labour policies in a particular area. By contrast, the job training 
programs include a whole series of actions aimed at providing occupational training and 
the specific professional skills required for undertaking various jobs in which there is a 
need to incorporate more workers. Finally, the employment support programs are 
professional job guidance schemes aimed at providing personal support to the 
unemployed. Their aim is to encourage participation in activities that might improve an 





In 2005 a fairly large percentage of workers participated in more than one SOC action 
during that twelve month period, actions which in virtually all cases corresponded to 
                                                 
2 One shortcoming of the database is the fact that we are unable to obtain any information as to the 
participation or otherwise of the 2005 beneficiaries in additional actions undertaken in 2006 or 2007. This 
should be borne in mind when interpreting the results below.  
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different programs. If we bear this fact in mind, the total number of participants was 
123,889, of whom 109,606 participated in one single action (88.47%), 12,790 in two 
(10.32%) and the rest in more than two (1.21%). While we are aware of this distinction, 
our analysis initially focuses on the beneficiaries of each action and not on the 
individuals themselves. In other words, we deal with the participants of each SOC 
action as if they had not participated in any other program. From our point of view, this 
procedure is appropriate, since within each action the number of participants that 
repeated the same action was virtually zero (i.e., we would not be counting the same 
individual more than once) and moreover, 82% of  the individuals that participated in 
more than one action did so by combining a work program with the regional 
employment pacts, an action for which we do not have much information for many 
individuals regarding their main control variables, namely date of birth and the level of 
education - an additional motive for excluding this action from our analysis. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the descriptive analysis of the 77,862 individuals that 
participated in the SOC programs selected in 2005 (having first eliminated those 
individuals for whom all the necessary information was not available and those actions 
that represented fewer than 4% of the total participants). The information presented in 
this table has been complemented with the descriptors of the control group, comprising 
730,871 individuals that did not participate in 2005 (nor before) in any SOC action. 
This table illustrates that the majority of the participants in SOC actions in 2005 were 
women (57.72%), Spanish nationals (85.13%), with an average age of 33.31 and a 
relatively low mean number of years of schooling (7.0). In the main, they were resident 
in the province of Barcelona (81.50%), followed by Tarragona (8.74%), Girona (5.62%) 
and Lleida (3.82%). We should also stress the large differences between programs, 
differences which, on the other hand, are expected bearing in mind the different nature 
and potential beneficiaries of the SOC actions. For example, there were notably fewer 
women in the vocational training workshops (casas-taller) and schools (casas de 
oficio), while their participants were notably younger. In fact, these two programs are 
oriented at this younger age group. Specifically, the vocational training workshops 
(casas-taller) seek to train and find employment for unemployed people below the age 
of 25, by alternating the acquisition of skills with work and professional practice 
acquired on specific projects undertaken in collaboration with non-profit, public and 
private entities. The participants are taught a skill over a maximum period of two years,  
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while earning 75% of the minimum interprofessional wage while working on a local 
community project. They are also given the possibility of completing their compulsory 
secondary education, if they have not already done so. The vocational training schools 
(casas de oficio) are mixed training and work programs designed for people under the 
age of 25 who have completed their basic education, be it compulsory secondary 
education (ESO), baccalaureate, vocational training or any other form of training 
considered essential to undertake a specific job, but who have not acquired a practical 
level of knowledge or are lacking professional experience. Participation on these 
programs ensures, on the one hand, a good level of training, alternated with effective 
work experience, and, on the other, participation on a public or social project, managed 
by a range of entities. The programs run for a maximum of 12 months and the pay the 
participants receive varies over this period.  
 
Likewise, the greater age of participants on the retraining (reciclaje) program is also 
understandable as its objective is to help individuals find work by providing them with, 
or perfecting, those professional skills they have lost in the workplace. This program is 
the only one in which the regional distribution of participants is not concentrated in the 




Finally, Table 3 compares the employment rate at the end of 2007/start of 2008 of 
participants on the programs analysed and non-participants. The comparison of these 
figures illustrates a difference in favour of the former of more than 6 percentage points 
(46.6% compared to 40.5%). A comparison by program highlights the effectiveness of 
public employment plans with a rate of almost 60% (58.5%), the job training programs 
for the unemployed (47.4%), the personalized employment support programs (46.3%) 
and the integrated actions (41.0%), with rates higher than those reported by non-
participants, while the retraining (reciclaje) program had a markedly lower rate 
(12.3%). However, these results do not take into consideration the possible differences 
in the characteristics of the individuals that participated in the programs and those that 
did not, which is why it is necessary to apply econometric techniques that allow us to 
consider their possible impact on the probability of being employed. This analysis is 





3. Methodology and results 
 
3.1. Evaluation of policies and matching techniques 
 
The aim of microeconometric policy evaluations typically involves responding to the 
question: What would have happened if this measure had not been implemented? In 
other words, in conducting a “counterfactual” analysis. In the specific case of labour 
market policies, it would involve assessing what the effect would be on a worker 
affected by a certain measure (for example, his or her participation in a training 
program) if they had not been affected by that measure (in other words, if he or she had 
not been on the program). In order to be able to evaluate the difference between the 
observed result and the counterfactual, the most usual approach involves comparing the 
situation of two groups of workers, one of which is affected by the measure and the 
other not. However, the main difficulty involves determining whether the improvement 
in the employment situation of the worker affected by the measure is a consequence of 
the measure itself or rather it is attributable to other factors that might often be 
unobservable. In other words, to what extent workers without a job who participated in 
a certain training program were not sufficiently motivated to find work before starting 
the program (selection bias).  
 
The methodology adopted in the natural and health sciences involves random 
assignment experiments. In such experiments, individuals are assigned quite randomly 
into two groups: one of these will be affected by the political measure (for example, a 
job training program) while the other will not. A comparison of the results obtained by 
the individuals in the first group (the treatment group) with those obtained by the 
second (the control group) enables us to assess the effectiveness of the policy. However, 
there are serious drawbacks in applying this methodology to labour market polices: first, 
there are ethical issues that make it impossible to give or deny access to a training 
program to someone who is unemployed based solely on a random decision; second, the 
costs, both in terms of finance and of time, of organizing and monitoring adequately the 
two groups are very high; and, finally, the application of the measure could be severely  
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delayed since the experiment would require a very careful design before applying the 
measure, and this delay could make it inappropriate or largely unnecessary when 
eventually adopted. Thus, the procedure we apply would be the only one possible when 
the measure we seek to evaluate is mandatory for the individuals affected (Cebulla, 
2006). 
 
Based on these arguments, the most usual approach for evaluating labour market 
policies involves the application of quasi-experimental methods (Rosenbaum, 1995). 
These methods are typically applied from two different perspectives, but both are based 
on the idea that once the measure has been applied, it is possible to conduct an ex-post 
analysis of the impact of the measure. The first approach involves comparing the 
situation of the individuals affected by the measure before and after, while the second 
involves identifying a posteriori individuals that did not participate in the programs 
evaluated so as to form a control group. The key to this second procedure involves 
identifying individuals who resemble as closely as possible those affected by the 
measure both in terms of their observable and unobservable characteristics, a process 
which in practice is very complicated. Thus, the possible presence of selection bias 
affects the reliability of the results obtained when using this procedure.  
 
Here, to evaluate active labour policies, we apply matching techniques or, more 
specifically, propensity score matching (PSM). This algorithm allows us to select from 
the control group of persons that did not participate in the programs that we seek to 
evaluate, those with the same propensity to participate on the program as those that 
actually did (Smith and Todd, 2005). In this way, we avoid the selection bias problem: 
that is, the fact that the persons who participate in the programs are those with better 
skills and aptitudes for finding work among all individuals without work
3. Specifically, 
the main assumption is that the selection bias is eliminated once we have controlled for 
a set of observable variables. Therefore, it is supposed that the result for a certain 
variable D (for example, work status) would be the same for participants (Y
1) and non-
participants (Y
0), once we have controlled for a set of variables X (such as gender, age, 
schooling level, etc.): 
 
                                                 
3 For further details, see Durán (2004.)  
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  [ ] [ ] X D X Y Y D / 1 Pr , , / 1 Pr
1 0 = = =  (1) 
 
This equality holds provided that the assumption of conditional independence also 
holds, that is, that D and Y
0 are independent for each value of X or, in other words, that 
the participation in the program is independent of the result obtained by those that do 
not participate on the program. A further relevant aspect is that of dimensionality, that 
is, the possibility of finding a non-participant with exactly the same characteristics as 
those of a participant. To overcome this problem, Rosenbaum and Rosen (1983) 
proposed analysing the propensity score instead of the probability. The results presented 




In order to apply propensity score matching, the first step involves estimating a logit 
model for the probability of being employed or otherwise using as explanatory variables 
the observable characteristics of the individual (nationality, gender, age, schooling and 
province of residence), which allows us to obtain the propensity score  for each 
individual to be participant or non-participant. Then, we need to link each participant 
with a non-participant based on a comparison of their observable characteristics. Thus, 
to implement the applied algorithm we need to decide on the number of non-participants 
that is to be used as the group of reference for each participant and what criteria will be 
used to find it. The results presented below were obtained by applying the procedure 
based on the nearest neighbour with random assignment and a proportion of participants 
to non-participants of 2:1. The results do not vary greatly if we apply other criteria 
(radius, caliper, etc.) and different proportions (5:1 and 10:1)
4. 
 
Table 4 shows the mean estimated effect of having participated in the various actions 
organized by SOC during 2005 as well as the effect on all participants, ignoring the fact 
that an individual might have participated in more than one action
5. The first column 
                                                 
4 All calculations were made using the psmatch2 procedure for STATA (Leuven and Sianesi, 2006). The 
results of the sensitivity analysis are available on request from the authors. 
5 Before applying the matching techniques, a probit model was specified and estimated for the probability 
of being employed at the end of 2007/start of 2008. The advantage of this type of specification over a 
descriptive analysis lies in the fact that it allows to control for the differences in the observable 
characteristics of the individuals (nationality, sex, age, schooling and province of residence). According 
to this model, having participated in the SOC programs during 2005 would increase the probability of  
  11
shows the percentage of individuals employed at the end of 2007/beginning of 2008 as a 
function of the SOC program in which they participated. The second column, by 
contrast, shows what the probability would have been of these individuals being 
employed if they had not participated on the program (counterfactual analysis). This 
probability is calculated by combining the information concerning the characteristics of 
the participants with that of the individuals in the control group that present the same 
propensity to participate in the programs. The third column shows the difference 
between the first and second columns; in other words, the change in probability of being 
employed as a consequence of having participated in the actions analysed. The fourth 
column shows the statistical value of the hypothesis test whose null hypothesis is that 
the effect of participating in the program is 0 as opposed to the alternative hypothesis 
whose value differs from 0, while the fifth column shows the p-value (the significance 




For those participating in one of the SOC actions (last row in the table), the percentage 
of individuals in work at the end of 2007/start of 2008 was 47.48%. And, according to 
the counterfactual analysis, if these individuals had not participated in the SOC 
programs, this percentage would have been 42.45%. Therefore, the difference between 
the two is 5.03% (47.48%-42.45%). This figure implies that the probability of finding a 
job for an individual that participated in one of the 2005 SOC actions analysed here rose 
by 5 percentage points as a direct result of their having participated. Furthermore, the 
statistical value of the hypothesis test and its associated p-value allow us to reject the 
null hypothesis that the effect detected is equal to 0.  
 
If we focus on the effect of the various programs, we observe that for the integrated 
actions, the personalized employment support programs, the job training for the 
unemployed and the public employment plans, the effect of participating in the SOC 
actions is positive and significant. This effect varies between 17.9% for the public 
                                                                                                                                               
being employed by 6.2%. When analysed by programs, we obtain positive and significant effects at the 
usual levels of significance in virtually all cases (the exceptions being the social protection programs, the 
vocational training schools and the retraining program), but it should be borne in mind that this approach 
does not overcome the selection bias, which might have a considerable impact on the results obtained. 
The results are available on request from the authors.  
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employment plans and 4.4% for the integrated actions. Note that there are three cases in 
which the effect of having participated on the SOC programs is not statistically different 
from 0 at the usual levels of significance (0.05 and 0.1). Specifically, these are the 
social protection program, the vocational training programs (casas-taller) and schools 
(casas de oficio). It is likely that in these three programs, and because of their very 
nature, the beneficiaries are still undergoing training two years after having participated 
(their ages being around 16-17 in 2005). Finally, there is one case where participating 
had a negative and significant effect. This was the retraining (reciclaje) program. 
According to the results shown in Table 4, the probability of being employed two years 
after having participated in the program was no more than 4.7%. This result could be 
related to the “lock-in” effect of individuals without work. The belief is that these 
persons might tend to continue receiving training once the initial program has finished 
and, therefore, reduce the intensity with which they seek work. 
 
An additional aspect which should be analysed when an algorithm such as the 
propensity score matching is applied is the quality of the matching between participants 
and non-participants. Specifically, we need to ascertain the extent to which we have 
found a group of individuals similar to that of the participants among the non-
participants. One way of verifying this is by calculating the reduction in the bias for 
each of the control variables that intervene in the algorithm between the total 
participants and the non-participants and those non-participants selected as the reference 
group. For each of the variables used to identify the non-participants most similar to the 
participants (nationality, gender, age, schooling), Table 5 shows the percentage of 
individuals in each category (for example, in the first row the percentage of Spaniards) 
and arithmetic mean (in the case of age) before matching and after matching both for 
the participants and for the control group. The values for the participants are the same 
but for the control group they are different. Specifically, the quality of matching is 
better the closer the control resembles participants after matching. The difference 
between the two groups is the bias and the last column shows the reduction in this bias 
after matching. As can be seen before matching, the bias (as an absolute value) is quite 
high for some of the variables. For example, before matching, the mean age of the 
participants is 33.12 while that of the non-participants is 37.75, a bias of 37.4%. By 
contrast, following matching, the bias is reduced to 0.2%, which implies a reduction of 
almost 100%. As can be seen in the table, the percentage reductions are high and the  
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bias following matching is, in all instances, below 5%, which guarantees the reliability 




As discussed in the first section above, an additional objective of this study was to 
assess the extent to which the policies analysed were complementary. As can be seen in 
Table 6, of the 71,625 individuals for whom we evaluated the efficacy of the SOC 
policies, 5,871 had participated in more than one program, representing 8.2% of the 
total
6. Of these individuals, 94.3% participated in just two programs. Here, it is 
important to point out that given the design of the SOC actions, in many cases it is not 
possible to participate in more than one program (for example, the unemployed workers 
on the vocational training programs, the casas-taller). Indeed, Table 7 shows that the 
combination of two programs was relatively infrequent in 2005.
7. In fact, the only 
combination of any great importance in absolute terms occurred on the job training 
programs for the unemployed and the personalized employment support programs with 
2,399 individuals. This figure is clearly greater than the rest of the combination of 
programs and represents around 45% of all the individuals that participated on more 
than one of the actions selected for 2005. In fact, the number of individuals that 
participated in each of the combinations of the remaining actions is markedly lower and 
was not sufficient to be able to apply the matching techniques presented in the sections 
above with adequate reliability.  
 
TABLES 6 and 7 
 
Therefore, we analysed whether the effectiveness of the combination of these two 
policies (training programs for the unemployed and the personalized employment 
support programs) was greater than that recorded by those who had only participated on 
one of the two programs. The fact that the number of participants that participated 
simultaneously on the two actions was relatively small in relation to the total number 
participating on each program (5.67% for training programs for the unemployed and 
                                                 
6 Here, it should be borne in mind that overall the program that was most often recorded in combination 
with another action was that of the regional employment pacts which have not been evaluated owing to 
the high number of missing data. 
7 Table 7 only shows those combinations where the number of participants rose above fifty.  
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11.40% for the personalized employment support programs) allows us to establish as a 
control group the remaining participants on each of the actions being evaluated. One of 
the first findings to highlight is that the rate of employment of the individuals that 
participated on the two programs was 53.85% compared to 47.33% for those who 
participated only on the training programs for the unemployed and 45.93% for those 
who did so only on the personalized employment support programs. It seems therefore 
that participating on the two programs was more effective than just participating on one. 
To confirm this, we applied the matching techniques described above for each of the 
two programs. Table 8 shows the results obtained. As can be seen, these results confirm 
the greater effectiveness of the combination of policies compared to having participated 
in just one program. This effect is around 8% for the training programs for the 
unemployed and 9% for the personalized employment support programs, which 




4. Final considerations  
 
The aim of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the active labour policies 
implemented by the Catalan Employment Office (SOC) in 2005. Our results, derived 
from the application of matching techniques, allow us to conclude that the probability of 
finding work in the case of an individual that participated during that year on one of the 
actions organized by SOC was 5 percentage points higher than that of someone who did 
not participate – and this being a consequence of their having participated in a SOC 
program. We also found evidence regarding the positive effect of most of the programs 
implemented, as well as the existence of differences between actions and an enhanced 
probability of finding employment among those participating in two or more programs. 
In fact, our analysis of the complementary nature of different actions might be extended 
in the future so as to determine whether there are differences in impact according to the 
sequence in which individuals participate on the programs analysed (see, for example, 
Lechner and Wieler, 2007). 
 
Finally, and while the results are of great interest to those with the task of designing 
labour market policies, an additional conclusion that can be drawn from the study is that  
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there are still various aspects that require an additional effort from government bodies 
when it comes to establishing protocols for gathering statistical information that permit 
the periodic evaluation of their policies. Specifically, in the first place, there is a need to 
take further steps towards analysing the efficiency of these policies (and not just their 
effectiveness). Second, there is a need to analyse specific job conditions, including 
number of working hours, contract conditions, wages, etc. both for participants and non-
participants in active policies. We believe these two aspects must be considered if we 
wish to undertake similar evaluations to those being made in other countries in this 




Arellano, F. A. (2009), “Do training programs get the unemployed back to work? A look at the Spanish 
experience”, Revista de Economía Aplicada, forthcoming. 
 
Cansino, J. M., Sánchez, A. (2009), “Evaluación del programa de escuelas-taller y casas de oficio a partir 
de su efecto sobre el  tiempo de búsqueda del primer empleo. El caso de Sevilla  “,  Estudios de Economía 
Aplicada, 27 (1), pp. 1-22. 
 
Card, D., Kluve, J., Weber, A. (2009), “Active Labor Market Policy Evaluations – A Meta-analysis”, 
Ruhr Economic Papers 86. 
 
Cebulla, A. (2006), Meta-Analysis of US welfare-to-work programs – approach, problems and lessons, 
National Centre for Social Research, London. 
 
Duran, C. (2004), “Evaluación microeconométrica de las políticas públicas de empleo: aspectos 
metodológicos”, Hacienda Pública Española / Revista de Economía Pública, 170 (3-2004), pp. 107-133. 
 
Fina, L., Toharia, L (2001), El reto del empleo, Editorial McGraw-Hill. 
 
Kluve, J. (2007), “The Effectiveness of European ALMP’s”, a Kluve, J. et al. (eds.), Active Labor Market 
Policies in Europe: Performance and Perspectives, Springer, Berlin and Heidelberg, pp. 153-203.  
 
Lechner, M., Wieler, S. (2007), Does the Order and Timing of Active Labor Market Programs Matter?, 
IZA Discussion Paper 3092. 
 
Leuwen, E., Sianesi, B. (2006), “PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and propensity 
score  matching, common support graphing, and covariate imbalance testing”, 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html. 
 
Mato, J., Cueto, B. (2009), “A nonexperimental evaluation of training programs: regional evidence for 
Spain”, Annals of Regional Science, 43, pp. 415-433 
 
Rosembaum, P. R. (1995), Observational studies, Springer-Verlag, Nova York. 
 
Rosenbaum P. R.. Rubin, D. B. (1983), “The central role of the propensity score in observational studies 
for causal effects”, Biometrika 70(1), pp. 41–55. 
 
Smith, J. A., Todd, P. (2005), Does matching overcome LaLonde’s critique of nonexperimental 




6. Tables and figures 
 
Table 1. Number of participants in SOC’s actions during 2005 
 
Area Program  Participants 
A Equal  opportunities  Integrated  actions  2,500  1.6% 
B  Job information and guidance  Personalized employment support  21,399  13.5% 
C Professional  qualification  Job  training  for  unemployed  42,768  27.0% 
   Social  guarantee  programs  1,910  1.2% 
   Retraining  2,625  1.7% 
D Work  and  training  Casas de oficio  1,534 1.0% 
   Escuelas taller  1,690 1.1% 
E  Job creation schemes  Regional employment pacts  77,166  48.7% 
     Public  employment  plans  6,823  4.3% 







Table 2. Descriptive analysis of participants and non-participants in 2005 SOC’s selected actions 
 
      Observations % Spaniards %Female Average age Schooling years % Barcelona % Girona % LLeida % Tarragona
Integrated actions  2462  64.8%  45.5%  28.9  5.8  75.2%  7.4%  3.0%  14.3% 
Personalized employment support  21035  88.7%  61.1%  36.0  7.0  78.6%  6.5%  4.3%  10.5% 
Job training for unemployed  42321  88.5%  64.4%  33.7  7.0  78.4%  7.3%  4.2%  10.1% 
Social guarantee programs  1882  78.6%  41.0%  17.0  5.8  84.0%  2.9%  1.7%  11.4% 
Retraining 806  96.4%  31.3%  35.1  7.8  25.9%  9.8%  41.6%  22.7% 
Casas de oficio  1500 62.7%  13.0%  17.4  5.7  70.8%  7.6%  5.9%  15.7% 
Escuelas taller  1611 74.9%  8.7%  19.1  6.0  79.8%  13.7%  3.5%  3.0% 














Total 77862  87.6%  58.1%  33.1  7.0  76.1%  7.3%  5.5%  11.1% 







Table 3. Employment rate of participants and 
non-participants in 2005 SOC’s selected actions 
 
     Observations Employment  rate 
Integrated actions  2462  41.3% 
Personalized employment support 21035  46.8% 
Job training for unemployed  42321  47.8% 
Social guarantee programs  1882  32.1% 
Retraining 806  39.8% 
Casas de oficio  1500 36.3% 
Escuelas taller  1611 36.0% 














Total 77862  47.5% 
Non participants  730871  40.5% 
 
 
Table 4. Effectiveness of 2005 SOC’s selected actions 
 
 Observed  Counterfactual       
   (participating)  (without participating) Difference T-stat P-value
Integrated actions  41.35%  36.94%  4.41%  2.26  0.01 
Personalized employment support  46.83%  40.91%  5.92%  3.25  0.00 
Job training for unemployed  47.76%  41.88%  5.88%  4.26  0.00 
Social guarantee programs  32.09%  27.05%  5.05%  0.65  0.26 
Retraining 39.83%  44.54%  -4.71%  -1.98  0.02 
Casas de oficio  36.33% 30.60%  5.73%  0.89  0.19 
Escuelas taller  36.00% 39.39%  -3.38%  -0.53  0.30 
Public employment plans  63.39%  45.49%  17.90%  9.64  0.00 






Table 5. Analysis of the quality of the matching 
 
Variable Sample  Participants  Control  %  Bias  %  Reduction 
Spaniard Before  87.8%  85.0%  8.1   
   After  87.8%  87.1%  2.1  74.5 
Non Spaniard  Before  12.2%  15.0%  -8.1   
   After  12.2%  12.9%  -2.1  74.5 
Male Before  58.3%  52.6%  11.5   
   After  58.3%  57.9%  0.7  93.5 
Female Before  41.7%  47.4%  -11.5   
   After  41.7%  42.1%  -0.7  93.5 
Age Before  33.12  37.75  -37.4   
   After  33.12  33.09  0.2  99.3 
No schooling  Before  8.3%  11.5%  -10.8   
   After  8.3%  8.2%  0.2  98.2 
Unfinished primary studies  Before  34.4%  29.8%  9.9   
   After  34.4%  34.1%  0.6  94.3 
Primary studies  Before  7.4%  3.2%  18.6   
   After  7.4%  8.0%  -2.7  85.7 
Secondary studies (lower)  Before  5.6%  7.9%  -9.1   
   After  5.6%  5.7%  -0.2  97.5 
Occupational training (1
st stage)  Before  11.2%  6.3%  17.3   
   After  11.2%  11.3%  -0.5  96.9 
Occupational training (2
nd stage)  Before  28.0%  30.7%  -5.8   
   After  28.0%  27.3%  1.5  74.2 
Secondary studies (upper)  Before  0.2%  0.7%  -6.7   
   After  0.2%  0.3%  -1.9  72.6 
University studies (1
st stage)  Before  2.0%  4.1%  -12.7   
   After  2.0%  2.0%  -0.1  99.4 
University studies (2
nd stage)  Before  2.9%  5.8%  -13.9   
   After  2.9%  3.0%  -0.1  99.2 
University studies (post-graduate) Before  0.0%  0.1%  -1.5   




Table 6. Number of participants in 2005 SOC’s selected actions  
according to the number of programs they have participated 
 









Table 7. Main combination of 2005 SOC’s selected actions 
 
Program 1  Program 2  Participants 
Job training for unemployed  Personalized employment support programs  2399
Job training for unemployed  Public employment plans  194
Integrated actions  Job training for unemployed  172
Integrated actions  Personalized employment support programs  161
Personalized employment support programs  Public employment plans  157
Personalized employment support programs  Social guarantee programs  99
Job training for unemployed  Social guarantee programs  80
 
 
Table 8. Effectiveness of combining 2005 SOC’s selected actions 
 
 Observed  Counterfactual       
   (participating)  (without participating) Difference  T-stat P-value
Job training for unemployed  53.86%  46.12%  7.73%  3.72  0.00 
Personalized employment support programs 53.86%  44.98%  8.88%  2.28  0.01 
 
 
 
 
 